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Abstract
Introduction: South Africa has the largest HIV/AIDS epidemic of any country in the world.
Case description: National antiretroviral therapy (ART) policy is examined over the period of
1999 to 2008, which coincided with the government of President Thabo Mbeki and his Minister of
Health, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. The movement towards a national ART programme in
South Africa was an ambitious undertaking, the likes of which had not been contemplated before
in public health in Africa.
Discussion and evaluation: One million AIDS-ill individuals were targeted to be enrolled in the
ART programme by 2007/08. Fewer than 50% of eligible individuals were enrolled. This failure
resulted from lack of political commitment and inadequate public health system capacity. The
human and economic costs of this failure are large and sobering.
Conclusions: The total lost benefits of ART not reaching the people who need it are estimated
at 3.8 million life years for the period, 2000 to 2005. The economic cost of those lost life years
over this period has been estimated at more than US$15 billion.
Introduction
South Africa is the epicentre of the HIV/AIDS epidemic
that is severely affecting nearly all countries in sub-Saha-
ran Africa. In 2008, the Joint United Nations Programme
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that South Africa has
the highest number of HIV-positive individuals in the
world, with the number of people living with HIV total-
ling 5,700,000 (CI: 4.9 million-6.6 million). The preva-
lence rate for adults aged 15 to 49 is estimated at 18.1%
(CI: 15.4%-20.9%), and the number of adults aged 15
and older living with HIV at 5.4 million (CI: 4.7 million-
6.2 million). Women aged 15 and older living with HIV
are disproportionally affected: the figure totals 3.2 million
(CI: 2.8 million-3.7 million). The number of children
aged up to 14 living with HIV totals 280,000 (CI:
230,000-320,000). And the number of deaths due to
AIDS in 2007 was 350,000 (CI: 270,000-420,000) [1].
The raw data on the human impact of the epidemic in
terms of ill and dying people is frightening, even in a
country with a population of 47 million people.
Prior to 1990, the level of HIV/AIDS infection in South
Africa was relatively insignificant (less than 1%). The issue
of major national importance was the struggle to obtain
democratic freedoms, which the majority of citizens were
denied by the apartheid governments of the (white)
National Party of South Africa. Democracy came in 1994
with the election of Nelson Mandela as the first freely
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Mbeki, who took over from Mandela subsequent to the
1999 election and continued in the role of President until
2008.
Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was appointed Minister of
Health in 1999 and had responsibility for health policy,
including HIV/AIDS and she continued in that role until
2008. She was a strong political ally of President Mbeki
throughout this period.
This paper undertakes an assessment of the response of
the South African Government to the epidemic over the
period, 1999 to 2008. It focuses on one of the most
important issues of the epidemic, namely, access to treat-
ment with antiretrovirals (ARVs) in an attempt to explain
the efficacy of policies and programmes implemented to
address the social, political and economic challenges that
widespread and high levels of untreated HIV pose for
nations.
Case description
National Strategic Plan 2000-2005
The first substantive policy action by President Mbeki's
government was instigating a national consultative proc-
ess with the aim of developing a National Strategic Plan
(NSP) for HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections
(STIs) in 1999. A National AIDS Council was set up to
oversee these developments. The NSP 2000-2005 was a
rather thin 31-page document, which had four priority
areas and attached goals [2]. The treatment priority had
three goals: to provide treatment, care and support serv-
ices in health facilities; to provide adequate treatment,
care and support services in communities; and to develop
and expand the provision of care to children and orphans.
To achieve these treatment priorities, five strategies were
identified:
1. Develop guidelines for the treatment and care of
HIV/AIDS patients in health facilities and the commu-
nity.
2. Ensure uninterrupted supply of appropriate drugs
for the treatment of opportunistic infections and other
related conditions.
3. Build capacity of health professionals to provide
comprehensive HIV/AIDS, STI and tuberculosis (TB)
treatment, care and support.
4. Establish strong links between health facilities and
community-based support programmes.
5. Improve prevention and treatment of TB and other
opportunistic infections.
Many in civil society perceived the plan as inadequate and
timid in its responses, particularly given the lack of finan-
cial commitment to achieve the rather modest goals. The
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) was at the forefront of
agitating for more resources to be pledged for HIV overall
and treatment in particular. AIDS advocates, particularly
the TAC, campaigned for a programme to use ARVs for
prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT), and
then for an overall national treatment programme for
AIDS that included making ARVs accessible.
Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Care, 
Management and Treatment 2003
In July 2002, government established a Joint Health and
Treasury Task Team to investigate issues relating to the
financing of an enhanced response to HIV/AIDS, based on
the NSP 2000-2005. A particular focus of the task team
was the treatment component of the NSP, namely, treat-
ment, care and support for those infected and affected by
HIV and AIDS.
As a result of much political pressure and agitation, in
November 2003, the Mbeki government approved the
operational plan that provided the structure for a compre-
hensive response to HIV and AIDS, including a planned
national rollout of antiretroviral therapy (ART) to all
South Africans and a PMTCT programme, both through
the public health system. Until 2003, South Africans with
HIV who used the public health system could get treat-
ment for opportunistic infections they suffered because of
their weakened immune systems, but could not get ART,
designed to specifically target HIV. The plan was ambi-
tious and projected to cost 11.986 billion South African
rands over five years.
The comprehensive plan included the following charac-
teristics [3]:
1. Development of provincial implementation plans
to be based on the district health systems within each
province.
2. Procurement and/or production of necessary medi-
cations and consumables at the lowest prices possible.
3. Upgrading of the national health laboratory system
to handle a significant increase in diagnostic testing
and monitoring of patient safety.
4. Elaborating an integrated nutritional programme
for people living with HIV and AIDS.
5. Development of a research agenda to support the
programme, including engagement of South African
academic centres and research institutions.Page 2 of 11
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cacy of the intervention, adverse drug events, resist-
ance and improvement and coordination of patient
information systems.
7. Development of staffing norms and standards for
the delivery of antiretroviral therapy and assessment
of human resource needs, including health system
managers, clinicians, nurses, pharmacists, nutrition-
ists and counsellors.
8. Creation of a programme management unit to coor-
dinate the implementation of the programme and rec-
ommendations for its functions, structure, staffing
and cost.
9. Development of a communications plan for health
providers and the public, including what to expect
from the proposed treatment programme.
10. Development of a detailed five-year programme
budget and an estimated 10-year budget to implement
the treatment programme.
11. Development of a detailed implementation sched-
ule.
To be successfully implemented, the comprehensive plan
needed significant additional investments in the public
health system to improve its capacity, in particular, its
human resource capacity. The comprehensive care and
treatment plan was to be delivered in an integrated fash-
ion within the public health system.
Yet more than half of the total expenditures envisaged in
the plan were to go toward emphasizing prevention and
promoting healthy lifestyles. In the absence of a cure for
AIDS, effective prevention strategies are critical. These
include provision of: barrier methods, voluntary counsel-
ling and HIV testing, PMTCT, post-exposure prophylaxis,
syndromic management of sexually transmitted infec-
tions, TB management, and a large and sustained infor-
mation, education and communication campaign.
The comprehensive plan proposed to build on testing
programmes to diagnose HIV and measure disease pro-
gression so that proper care and treatment regimens could
be implemented. That included: ongoing medical services
to provide treatment for opportunistic infections associ-
ated with HIV and ultimately, the provision of ARVs to
arrest the progression to AIDS; an extensive nutrition
intervention; and programmes to integrate the provision
of medical care with traditional methods of healing. A full
range of community support services was also contem-
plated, including:, counselling; adherence support
groups; community mobilization efforts to reduce stigma
and discrimination; patient transport; home- and com-
munity-based care; and, when necessary, palliative care.
To take but one measure, Table 1 shows the anticipated
patient demand for ARVs in the care programme by year,
with HIV-positive patients undergoing periodic CD4
counts, and in those patients with CD4 counts of < 200
cells/mm3, the commencement of treatment with ARVs.
The aim was to achieve universal (100%) treatment cover-
age of new AIDS cases by the end of 2007/08. The esti-
Table 1: South African National Department of Health Comprehensive Plan: planned number of patients on ARVs and associated 
costs and total costs
Year New cases starting
ARVsa
Total cases on
ARVsa
Total ARV diagnostic
costs (ZAR million)b
Total ARV drug costs
(ZAR million)c
Total plan costs (ZAR
million)d
2003/
04
53,000 53,000 13 42 296
2004/
05
138,315 188,665 108 369 1590
2005/
06
215,689 381,177 227 725 2358
2006/
07
299,516 645,740 394 1,118 3268
2007/
08
411,889 1,001,534 620 1,650 4474
Total 1362 3904 11,986
Source: Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa. Pretoria; National Department of Health, 
19 November 2003.
Notes:
a Table 16.8, p. 248Page 3 of 11
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b Table 16.11, p. 250
c Table 16.13, p. 250
d Table 16.20, p. 256
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on ARVs.
It was an ambitious plan, the likes of which had not been
attempted before in a resource-challenged environment
like South Africa. In total, 22,500 new health workers
would be recruited over the five-year period, including
1,100 new doctors, who are critical to management of
ARV treatment for AIDS-ill patients.
Discussion and evaluation
Available resources to achieve policy targets
The resources available over the period, 2000-2008, came
from two sources: internal and external. The internal
resources included national and provincial government
contributions, as well as those of private individuals. The
external funds came from three main sources: multilateral
organizations, foreign governments, and private founda-
tions and other non-governmental organizations. The
major external contributors included the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the United States
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and
the European Union.
Table 2 indicates the extent of South African resources
pledged to address the epidemic. It includes only govern-
ment planned expenditure to achieve the aims of the com-
prehensive plan. This value needs to be tempered by the
difficult-to-estimate level of private expenditure that
occurred. The estimate provided here should be treated
with caution. External partners have also contributed sig-
nificantly, which has complemented local efforts. Since
the adoption of the comprehensive plan, South Africa has
committed a substantially increased level of domestic
resources into the national AIDS response. Yet at its larg-
est, it is only 0.16% of gross domestic product (GDP).
Southern African neighbours with equally serious epi-
demics, but much less resources, have committed much
larger per capita expenditures. In 2005, Botswana com-
mitted 2.07% of its GDP to HIV/AIDS-related expendi-
tures, Malawi 4.16%, Zambia 2.79% and Zimbabwe
0.87% [4].
Internal sources
The system of governance in the South African federal sys-
tem involves the national government primarily raises
taxes and distributing these taxes to provinces in tied and
untied grants for service delivery purposes. So national
government controlled most of the available resources
and overall policy direction for HIV/AIDS, but relied
upon provincial governments to deliver services. Provin-
cial government also engaged in discretionary spending
on HIV/AIDS. The ambitious plan was projected to cost
11.986 billion South African rands, or US$1,915 million
at prevailing exchange rates, over five years.
There are three main types of HIV and AIDS specific allo-
cations. These are:
1. The budget of the HIV and AIDS Directorate in the
national Department of Health (national equitable
share).
2. HIV/AIDS interventions coming from national gov-
ernment to provinces (conditional grants).
3. HIV- and AIDS-specific funds in provincial budgets
(equitable spend allocations).
Table 2: Internal resources available for HIV/AIDS: South Africa, 2000-2008
Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
National government - - - 352 453 396 433 456 970
National conditional grants to provinces - - - 333 782 1135 1567 1646 1735
Provincial governments - - - 284 365 514 874 1088 1225
Total (ZAR million)a 214 348 1000 970 1600 2045 2874 3190 3930
$/ZAR exchange rateb 6.96 8.62 10.53 7.57 6.48 6.38 6.79 7.07 8.30
Total ($ million) 30.7 40.37 94.96 128.13 246.91 320.53 423.27 451.20 473.49
GDP ($ billion)c 132.88 118.48 110.88 166.65 216.44 242.06 254.99 277.58 n/a
SA government resources as a % of GDP 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.16 n/a
Sources: See below.
Notes:
aNational Treasury, National and Provincial Budgets. http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/default.aspx for relevant years 
(Accessed 2 June 2009) and National Department of Health. Pretoria; National Department of Health. Values for 2000-2002 were only given in 
aggregate and not broken down by method of delivery.
bOanda FXHistory: Historical Currency Exchange Rates. http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory (Accessed 2 June 2009). The yearly value 
was calculated by taking the daily interbank rate for each day in each year and averaged.
cWorld Bank, World Development Indicators. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/
0,,contentMDK:21725423~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (Accessed 2 June 2009). South African GDP converted 
into $ equivalents.Page 4 of 11
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condition that they be spent on services or interventions
specified by the national government. Spending of the
funds is limited to specific areas identified by the national
government for which provinces must develop appropri-
ate business plans.
Actual expenditure
Government
As shown in Table 3, expenditure up to and including
2003 concentrated largely on prevention activities, such as
life-skills and HIV/AIDS training in primary and second-
ary schools, and free condom provision.
Over the five years of the comprehensive plan, actual gov-
ernment spending totalled $1,602 million as opposed to
projected budgeted spending of $1,915 million. This rep-
resents an under spend of $313 million. The main reasons
for the under spend was the performance of provinces in
being unable to implement the required health system
changes in a timely manner and an inability to hire suffi-
cient health workers to enable the ambitious programme
goals to be achieved.
Private individuals
South Africa has an extensive and sophisicated private
health care system. The comprehensive plan did not
incorporate nor attempt to engage with the private health
system.
External sources
The Global Fund, established in 2002, is a partnership
between governments, civil society, the private sector and
affected communities. It has become the main external
source of finance for programmes to fight AIDS, tubercu-
losis and malaria, with approved funding of US$11.4 bil-
lion for more than 550 programmes in 136 countries. It
provides a quarter of all international financing for AIDS
globally. The Global Fund's contributions to South Africa
since 2003 have totalled $228.5 million. This amount has
been channelled through the national government
budget, so it has inflated the supposed contribution of the
national government to internal funding towards HIV/
AIDS.
The largest single increase in external funding for HIV/
AIDS came from the US Government via President George
Bush's 2003 initiative, PEPFAR, as shown in Table 4. Total
funding pledged for the first five fiscal years was US$15
billion, although a total of $18.8 billion was expended in
2004-2008. As part of the PEPFAR contribution, the US
Government has pledged $4 billion out of a total Global
Fund pledge of $18 billion in the fiscal years of 2002 to
2008.
South Africa is one of PEPFAR's 15 focus countries, which
collectively represent approximately 50% of HIV infec-
tions worldwide. Under PEPFAR, South Africa received
$89.3 million in fiscal year (FY) 2004, $148.2 million in
FY 2005, $221.5 million in FY 2006, $397.8 million in FY
2007 and $590.9 million in FY 2008 to support compre-
hensive HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care pro-
grammes. This is a total of $1,447 million over the past
five years.
Treatment data
Objective criteria provide evidence with which an evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of responses within countries can
be made. In the case of South Africa's comprehensive
plan, these data indicate that the responses to ameliorate
the epidemic have been only partially effective.
Table 3: Actual expenditure by HIV/AIDS programme: South Africa 2000-2008
Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Prevention 200 313 458 132 134 136 144 152 229
Care & treatment 14 25 546
Care 69 79 186 191 195 208
Treatment 686 1235 1531 2001 2102 3078
Total (ZAR million) 214a 348a 1004a 887b 1448b 1853b 2336b 2449b 2870c 13,846
$/ZAR exchange rated 6.96 8.62 10.53 7.57 6.48 6.38 6.79 7.07 8.30
Total ($ million) 30.7 40.37 120.65 117.17 223.45 290.44 344.03 346.39 398.43 1,911.63
Sources: See below.
Notes:
aHickey A: What Budget 2002 means for HIV/AIDS. Budget Brief 90, IDASA Budget Information Service, February 26, 2002. www.idasa.org.za 
(Accessed 15 June 2009)
bNdlovu N, Budget allocations for HIV and AIDS in 2005/6 provincial sector budgets: Implications for Improved Spending. Budget 
Brief 156, IDASA Budget Information Service, 5 August 2005. www.idasa.org.za (Accessed 15 June 2009)
cMukotsanjera V, HIV/AIDS domestic financing in South Africa. February 2008, IDASA. www.idasa.org.za (Accessed 15 June 2009)
dOanda FXHistory: Historical Currency Exchange Rates. http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory (Accessed 15 June 2009). The yearly value 
was calculated by taking the daily interbank rate for each day in each year and averaged.Page 5 of 11
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act with the public health sector, then an examination of
the progress in the biggest HIV-related programme, the
National ARV Treatment Programme, should be instruc-
tive.
There are no accurate estimates of the total number of
people on antiretroviral treatment because of such factors
as the national Department of Health's poor monitoring
system (except for the Western Cape province), no prov-
ince records, loss to follow up and deaths.
The Joint Civil Society Monitoring Forum was formed in
June 2004 and is made up of several leading civil society
and private sector organizations. The forum is dedicated
to monitoring the implementation of the operational
plan. Its latest estimate is that in June 2007, a total of
257,108 people were on treatment [5].
This contrasts with the Department of Health's assertion
that that the estimated number of people needing treat-
ment in South Africa was 764,000 by the middle of 2006,
of which a total of 353,945 were enrolled in the ART pro-
gramme and 273,400 were initiated on the programme in
2006. In 2007, 889,000 people needed treatment, of
whom 488,739 enrolled and 371,731 were initiated on
the ART programme [6]. These statistics were derived from
a statistic model as opposed to actual clinic data, and they
should be treated with great caution.
The World Health Organization's and UNAIDS' midpoint
estimate was that 206,500 people living with HIV
(PLHIV), or equivalent to 21% of the number estimated
to be in need, were on ART in South Africa as at December
2005. These values should be treated with caution given
the South African Government data upon which the esti-
mate was made [7].
An estimate by a major supplier (Aspen Pharmacare) of
ARVs delivered to the Department of Health is that about
350,000 people were on treatment as at February 2008
[8]. Aspen supplies 80% of the public sector's ARV drug,
lamivudine. Nearly all first-line patients are put on lami-
vudine. Apparently, the company projected its sales to the
public sector and then added on the remaining supply of
lamivudine by GlaxoSmithKline and a projection for the
number of people who have moved to second-line ther-
apy. The calculation is not in the public domain and
should be treated with great caution.
No comprehensive methodical analysis of the number of
people on ARVs in the private health system has been
done. The Joint Civil Society Monitoring Forum estimates
that in the order of 100,000 people were receiving treat-
ment through the private sector in 2007 [5]. This estimate
should be treated with some caution.
Estimate of number of untreated lives lost
Whatever the accurate numbers are, the uptake of ARVs
has fallen well short of anticipated levels. Many hundreds
of thousands on South Africans in need of ARVs are still
not receiving them or have died whilst waiting for them,
despite the comprehensive plan.
An estimate of the loss of life years that resulted from the
ineffectual policy responses of President Mbeki and Min-
ister Tshabalala-Msimang was recently made. The study
compared the number of persons who received ARVs for
treatment and PMTCT transmission between 2000 and
2005 with an alternative of what was reasonably feasible
in the country during that period. It was estimated that
more than 330,000 lives, or approximately 2.2 million life
years, were lost because a timely ARV treatment pro-
gramme was not implemented in South Africa over that
period. Some 35,000 babies were born with HIV, resulting
in 1.6 million life years lost by not implementing a
PMTCT programme using the ARV drug, nevirapine. The
total lost benefits of ARVs not being accessible to all in
need are estimated at 3.8 million life years for the period,
2000-2005 [9].
Value of lives lost
The value of a human life or one additional year of a
human life is inherently controversial. The benefit of the
provision of ARVs is that it stops PLHIV dying prema-
turely. It also has another advantage in that it generally
improves the quality of life of those years gained.
The above estimate of life years lost does not take into
account the value of those life years to society. Given that
the costs of treating and also of not treating PLHIV with
ARVs has been made and an estimate of the number of life
years has also been made, then it is logical to attempt to
value the benefits that would have accrued to South Afri-
can society if those lives and life years had not been lost.
There are two main methods used in measuring the value
of a human life: human capital approach and willingness
to pay (WTP) [10,11]. Both are controversial and have
Table 4: US Government resources for HIV/AIDS: South Africa 
2003-2008 ($ million)
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Value 89.3 148.2 221.5 397.8 590.9 1,447.7
Source: The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR), Country Operational Plan Summaries - South 
Africa. Various years. http://www.pepfar.gov/countries/c19712.htm 
(Accessed 15 June 2009)Page 6 of 11
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attempts at valuing lives saved used the human capital
approach. In this approach, a human being is regarded as
an asset with a capital value based (as is the case for any
asset) on the future returns it will earn. In the human case,
these returns are earnings. Hence, the value of a life is the
present value of the stream of expected future earnings.
Some implications are that the young are generally worth
more than the old, although the very young, who have yet
to incur education and upbringing costs, may have quite
a low value. High-income individuals have a greater value
than the poor. Questions that arise in using the human
capital approach are whether gross or net earnings, or
gross earnings less consumption, should be used. The
arguments are that although with death an individual
ceases to be a member of society (hence their death is cost-
less per se), it is his or her contribution to the rest of society
which is lost and should be valued.
The main criticisms of this approach are:
• Non-productive individuals (e.g., the elderly and chron-
ically ill) have negative returns so that any lengthening of
their lives represents a loss.
• Consumption benefits of health care are not included.
• Earnings do not reflect social productivity because if an
individual dies, his or her position would be filled by
someone else so that the loss of production will be related
to adjustments necessary, not the earnings of the replaced
individual.
The other main approach is based on willingness to pay
(WTP) to reduce the risk of death. Health care projects
that save lives do not (except in the very short term) save
specific lives, but rather reduce the risks faced by all or a
subset of the population. Hence, it may be possible, by
asking or by carrying out appropriate experiments, to
ascertain the WTP of relevant groups for a reduction in the
risk of death from a particular cause.
Related approaches use market prices to infer the value
individuals place on reductions in risk. For example, the
amounts individuals spend on life-protecting safety
devices or on safer forms of transport may be used to infer
valuations. Another approach is based on occupational
risk: the argument is that measurement of the monetary
compensation (higher wages) received for high-risk occu-
pations will allow us to infer valuations [11]. If an indi-
vidual earns an extra $10,000 per annum for facing an
increase of 20 percentage points in the chance of dying
each year, then it may be inferred that the individual val-
ues their life at $50,000 per annum. Taking the present
value of this stream of values will give the capital value.
Besides saving lives, health care offers benefits of many
kinds. It may reduce pain and discomfort, increase mobil-
ity and generate peace of mind. How might these various
effects be valued?
The approaches taken to answering this question mirror
to a large extent the approaches taken to the valuation of
life. A human capital approach would find the present
value of the difference in lifetime earnings between those
receiving and those not receiving treatment. The assump-
tion behind this is that all the adverse effects of a medical
problem will show up in earnings. A WTP approach
would try to find out, by asking or by experiment, what
individuals are prepared to pay to avoid the effects of a
particular condition or to reduce the risks of suffering
these effects. Observation of market behaviour (e.g., of
amounts spent on medicines) may allow inferences to be
drawn about WTP to avert certain types of effects. Given a
societal perspective, there is a maximum WTP that repre-
sents the benefits (utility) that all individuals would
expect to achieve if they had access to a particular health
care service.
Next, it is necessary to assess the resources required to pro-
vide that service (cost) and to compare this to the total
value to society (benefit) from having access to a health
care service. In the societal perspective, the benefits of
improved health care are comprised of the benefits to the
affected individuals (use value), as well as the benefits
that the rest of society can expect to achieve from knowing
that the service is available (non-use value).
One objective may be to determine the value to an indi-
vidual or community of a particular good or service. Then
it is necessary to evaluate the value of the service to all of
those who may benefit from this service (both users and
non-users) and to compare this to the costs. If an individ-
ual or a community agree that they want to give up their
financial resources to pay for a good or service (through
user charges, private insurance, taxes, social insurance or
charities), then it can be concluded that the benefits
exceed the costs. The benefit-cost ratio is greater than one
and the intervention is recommended. However, if indi-
viduals or a community indicate that they are unwilling or
unable to give up the financial resources to provide a
health service, then the costs exceed the benefits. If the
service has a benefit-cost ratio of less than one, then inter-
vention is not recommended.
To overcome philosophical objections and methodologi-
cal difficulties in valuing life and life years, it has been
assumed here that the value of one year of human life is
equivalent to the value of per capita South Africa's GDP in
the year of that human life. That is, the value of one year
of human life is equivalent to the value of economic out-
put for an average South African during one calendar year.Page 7 of 11
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the period, 2000 to 2005, has been calculated in Table 5.
Conservatively assuming that the value of one life year is
equivalent to the per capita contribution to GDP in that
year, it is estimated that the economic cost to South Afri-
can society of these avoidable life years lost through pre-
mature death over the six-year period is more than $15
billion.
Given that the actual expenditure by government on HIV/
AIDS programmes over the same period was $822.78 mil-
lion (from Table 3), it would seem the orders of magni-
tude would strongly suggest that higher levels of
expenditure should have been made to avoid the
extremely large reduction in GDP of $15 billion, which
arose as a result of the inadequate treatment response by
government.
Reasons for lack of policy effectiveness
Early on in the epidemic, Jonathan Mann outlined a three-
point typology for describing the policy response to epi-
demics of infectious or communicable diseases like HIV/
AIDS. The three stages through which policy responses
can move forward, and unfortunately sometimes back-
wards, are [12]:
• First: Denial - that the epidemic is present within the
country, reflected either by an absence of any prevent-
ative or treatment measures or by entry restrictions for
foreigners with HIV.
• Second: Recognition - that the epidemic is present in
the country. A country will admit that cases of the epi-
demic are occurring and will adopt measures to find
out how widespread the epidemic is.
• Third: Mobilization - will finally occur, which means
that a country gets active, both on societal and govern-
ment level to hinder the further spread of the epi-
demic.
HIV/AIDS received scant attention from the National
Party government prior to 1994. It was not seen as a major
problem or, if perceived as such, it was seen as a "black
man's disease". The new democratic government had
many issues confronting it and HIV/AIDS did not rank
very highly given its (then) relative insignificance. Yet a
discernable shift from denial to recognition of the epi-
demic was seen in President Mandela's public references
to the issue, unlike his predecessors. Unfortunately, the
level of infection was rapidly growing. In 1993, the HIV
prevalence rate among pregnant women was 4.3%, which
had increased to 12.2% by 1996 and to 22.4% by 1998
[13].
In 1999, newly installed President Mbeki stated that the
drug, AZT, used in the prevention of mother to child
transmission treatment (PMTCT), was toxic and danger-
ous to health and that the government would not be pro-
vide it in the public health system [14]. He went further
and defended a small group of dissident scientists who
claim that AIDS is not caused by HIV, and questioned the
efficacy of all antiretroviral drugs because they target HIV
[15].
In April 2000, in his opening speech to the International
AIDS Conference in Durban, President Mbeki avoided ref-
Table 5: Value of HIV/AIDS lives lost: South Africa 2000-2005 ($)
Year Lost life years - 
ARTa
Lost life years - 
PMTCTa
Total lost life 
yearsa
GDP per capita 
US$b
Lost annual GDP $c As a % of GDPd
2000 36,180 25,380 61,560 3042 187,539,300 0.001
2001 126,630 152,280 278,910 2644 737,438,040 0.006
2002 330,310 279,180 609,490 2439 1,486,546,110 0.013
2003 524,610 380,700 905,310 3589 3,249,157,590 0.019
2004 643,200 444,150 1,087,350 4646 5,051,828,100 0.023
2005 578,880 317,250 896,130 5163 4,626,719,190 0.019
Total 2,239,810 1,598,940 3,838,750 15,339,228,000
$15.33 billion
Sources: see below.
Notes:
aChigwedere P, et al: Estimating the Lost Benefits of Antiretroviral Drug Use in South Africa. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome 2008 44:410-415. Tables 1 and 2.
bAuthor's calculation. GDP values obtained from World Bank, World Development Indicators. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21725423~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (Accessed 15 June 2009). South African 
GDP converted into $ equivalents. Population values obtained from Statistics South Africa, Mid-Year Population Estimates. Publication P0302 - 
Various Years. www.statssa.gov.za/publications/p0302/populationstats.asp (Accessed 15 June 2009)
cAuthor's calculation.
dAuthor's calculation.Page 8 of 11
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erty, fuelling suspicions that he saw poverty, rather than
HIV, as the main cause of AIDS. The basis for President
Mbeki's denialism and reversal of government policy
positions were never clearly enunciated by the man him-
self, although Nattrass discusses the many and varied
hypotheses, clearly favouring the President's belief in his
exceptionally high option of his intellectual capacities
which he believed outranked those of medical and social
"experts" in the field [16,17]
There was now clear evidence that the South African Gov-
ernment was moving from recognition back to denial
about the epidemic. At that time, most political leaders in
sub-Saharan Africa would have been considered to be in a
state of denial, but in the process of moving toward recog-
nition as evidence of the impacts of the epidemic were
becoming increasingly hard to avoid [18]. President
Mbeki and his administration were moving in the oppo-
site direction. Minister Tshabalala-Msimang had responsi-
bility for health policy, including HIV/AIDS. She and
President Mbeki were repeatedly accused of failing to
respond adequately to the epidemic. Fortunately, the pro-
fessionals in the under-resourced public health system in
South Africa attempted to respond to the treatment needs
of HIV-positive people for opportunistic infections,
although these systems were overwhelmed by the scale of
need and the lack of antiretroviral drugs.
Yet there were also signs of hope. President Mbeki's gov-
ernment was applauded by AIDS activists for its successful
legal defence against action brought by multinational
pharmaceutical companies in April 2001 of a law that
would allow local production of cheaper medicines. Ini-
tial prices of ARV drugs were extremely high for a middle-
income country like South Africa. It was only in 2002 and
2003 that prices began to moderate sufficiently to allow
low-income countries to seriously consider universal
treatment options. People in South Africa obtain medi-
cines either through the public health system or from pri-
vate dispensing doctors and pharmacies. Patients receive
medicines for free from the public health system, but have
to put up with long waiting times and inconsistent and
missing service. Private sector patients are usually insured
by a medical scheme to which they pay a monthly pre-
mium.
In 2002, South Africa's High Court ordered the govern-
ment to make the ARV drug, nevirapine, available to preg-
nant women to help prevent mother to child transmission
of HIV. Despite international drug companies offering
free or cheap antiretroviral drugs, President Mbeki's gov-
ernment restricted access to them and remained extremely
hesitant about providing treatment for people living with
HIV.
Despite the AIDS denialism of President Mbeki and Min-
ister Tshabalala-Msimang, significant government finan-
cial resources were mobilized. However, these resources
were insufficient despite the efforts of the South African
Government and the initiation of PEPFAR after the
announcement of the comprehensive plan. Less than half
of the people requiring ARVs are currently receiving them.
Some of the reasons for this lack of effectiveness are now
briefly discussed.
Possible explanations for the slow and ineffective
responses include:
Political commitment
"Positive" political discussion and action about HIV is rel-
atively scarce in South Africa. Successful country
responses to the epidemic, as in Uganda and Senegal,
have had in common the existence of political will or
commitment from the head of state downwards. Stigma
and discrimination lie behind the denial and silence from
South African political leaders. As long as HIV is not dis-
cussed openly, denial of the problem will exist. The
importance of leaders in addressing HIV to overcome
silence and stigma is critical. Without "positive" political
dialogue, the problems that arise from HIV infection will
continue to be surrounded by ignorance, myths and, of
course, denial that the problem exists in the first place.
The effort of government toward implementing the com-
prehensive plan was damaged by the attitude towards
HIV/AIDS and its treatment by Minister Tshabalala-Msi-
mang and President Mbeki. Tshabalala-Msimang's
administration as Minister of Health was controversial
because of her reluctance to adopt a public sector plan for
treating AIDS with ARVs. She was called "Dr Beetroot" for
promoting the benefits of beetroot, garlic and lemons, as
well as focusing on good general nutrition, while referring
to possible toxicities of ARVs. She followed an AIDS pol-
icy in line with the ideas of President Mbeki, her political
ally.
Minister Tshabalala-Msimang placed her emphasis on
broad public health goals, seeing AIDS as only one aspect
of that effort and one which, because of the financial costs
of treatment, might impede broader efforts. She was not
convinced by the mounting economic evidence that AIDS
is such a burden on the public health system that treating
it would actually free up costs. She was in charge of the
ARV rollout, but continued to emphasize the importance
of nutrition and to urge others to see AIDS as only one
problem among many in South African health.
At the International AIDS Conference in Toronto, Canada,
on 18 August 2006, Stephen Lewis, the United Nations
Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa, closed the conferencePage 9 of 11
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said South Africa promoted a "lunatic fringe" attitude
toward HIV and AIDS, describing the government as
"obtuse, dilatory, and negligent about rolling out treat-
ment" [19].
Health system capabilities (especially human resources for health)
A lack of resources, both physical and human, to improve
the health of the population existed prior to the compre-
hensive plan. The infrastructure required for the increased
levels of health activities was often lacking. Hospitals,
clinics, health staff and consumables were commonly in
short supply before the epidemic. The epidemic merely
places more pressure on resources despite additional
funding being available.
There are insufficient health workers in South Africa to
enable normal health care needs to be met. The maldistri-
bution and inadequate numbers of health workers are
causing delays in expanding ARV treatment. Waiting lists
for treatment are growing at clinics as a result of staff
shortages. Even with "task shifting" from doctors to nurses
to community workers, insufficient staff means that ARV
diagnosis, treatment and monitoring is restricted. It has
recently been suggested that an extension of this commu-
nity-based pathway is possibly the only means by which
the increasing ARV case loads can be adequately managed
[20].
There is a general shortage of health workers in South
Africa. The shortage is clear in the number of vacant pub-
lic health worker posts, which show that out of a required
workforce of 196,585, 65,432 posts were unfilled [21].
This shortage is further exacerbated by the highly uneven
distribution of health workers between the public and pri-
vate sectors. The ratios of medical practitioners to popula-
tion in public and private sector are, respectively, one per
4,219 and one per 602 [21]. The comprehensive plan uti-
lized only public health workers. This unevenness is also
shown in the geographical distribution, with rural areas
having a much lower ratio of health workers to popula-
tion than urban areas.
The private health sector in South Africa is highly formal-
ized, well developed and resource intensive. Health pro-
fessionals are attracted from the public to the private
sector by higher remuneration rates, more favourable
working conditions and better access to advanced tech-
nology [22].
In addition to facing shortages of staff throughout the
public health system, South Africa faces additional chal-
lenges in retaining health workers due to increasing levels
of migration. In 2006, the number of South African health
workers working abroad totalled 23,400: 8900 doctors,
6800 nurses and 7700 other health workers [21].
Given the skills shortage in health care, the number of
new graduates produced annually is a possible key area
for intervention. In South Africa, there are 401 nursing
education institutions and eight medical schools. The
average number of enrolments per medical school per
annum was 200 in 2007, which equates to approximately
1600 enrolments nationally [21]. Doctors take a mini-
mum of six years to train, and are required to do one year
of community service before being allowed to work in the
private sector.
There are three main streams through which nurses are
trained: universities, nurse training colleges and two-year
bridging courses. The bridging courses enable enrolled
nurses and nursing auxiliaries to train and register as pro-
fessional nurses. In 2006, the total number of nurses grad-
uating from universities and training colleges totalled
2027 [21].
Clearly, the mobilization of the private sector is critical to
achieving the goals of the comprehensive plan. Present
numbers of health workers are insufficient and present
trends for training new and replacement workers are
clearly inadequate. Until the issue of resource mobiliza-
tion in health, especially human resources, is adequately
addressed, the goals of the comprehensive plan will prove
difficult to achieve.
Conclusions
Progress in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been
made in South Africa, which is one of the few countries in
sub-Saharan Africa with the resources to provide ART for
all of its people with AIDS. However, the majority of
patients who require ART are still not receiving it. As a
result, in most hospitals in South Africa, it is still common
to see patients without access to ART dying of opportunis-
tic infections, including TB. There were an estimated
360,000 AIDS deaths in 2007. This has brought the cumu-
lative number of AIDS deaths to 2.2 million people [1].
The estimated number of deaths as a result of an inade-
quate policy response between 2000 and 2005 was that
more than 330,000 lives, or approximately 2.2 million life
years, were lost because a timely ARV treatment pro-
gramme was not implemented in South Africa over that
period. Furthermore, 35,000 babies were born with HIV,
resulting in 1.6 million life years lost by not implement-
ing a PMTCT programme using the ARV drug, nevirapine.
The total lost benefits of ARVs are estimated at 3.8 million
life years for the period, 2000-2005 [16].Page 10 of 11
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The economic cost of those 3.8 million lost life years over
the period, 2000 to 2005, through premature death over
the six-year period is more than $15 billion.
This paper has attempted to explain HIV/AIDS policy
responses and the resources available to achieve the goals
over the period, 1999 to 2008. An explanation of the rea-
sons behind the failure to implement the national ART
programme in a timely and effective manner from 2003
onwards is offered, as is how the recent progress towards
universal ART coverage might be improved and/or
achieved.
A new five-year National Strategic AIDS Plan 2007-2011
[23] has been introduced, and in August 2008, the
removal of President Mbeki and simultaneously the
replacement of Minister Tshabalala-Msimang with a new
Minister for Health energized AIDS activism in South
Africa. The new plan allocates about R45 billion (about
$6 billion) towards HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment.
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